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In perhaps the last piece completed before his sudden death in April 2014 Ernesto Laclau 
returned to the concept of antagonism (Laclau, 2015, pp. 101-125). Its conceptual origins lie 
in his immanent critique of, and break with, Marxism in the 1970s. Laclau concluded that 
antagonism points to the limits of social objectivity and linked this to an original political 
ontology (see Marchart 2016 and Hansen 2016). The development of this concept is, in 
effect, the story of Laclau’s theoretical journey. In tracking this conceptual history I 
demonstrate its continued pertinence to contemporary political theory and link it to the 
rethinking of representation, to idealisation in political theory, and to the understanding of 
anti-austerity politics. 
 
ANTAGONISM AND THE LIMITS OF MARXISM 
 
Laclau first considered the notion of antagonism in a 1970 article ‘Argentina: Imperialist 
Strategy and the May Crisis’ (Laclau, 1970) analysing the Argentinian crisis of May 1969, 
which began with a joint student-trade union demonstration in Córdoba, and culminated in a 
nation-wide protest. It was pivotal to the end of the 1973 military dictatorship. Laclau poses 
an innocuous question: why did middle class students unite with trade unionists to oppose the 
dictatorship of Ongania? Since the anti-Peronist coup of 1955 the military had exercised 
indirect power through control over economic policy, and exclusion of the Peronists from 
government. Laclau argued that the military propped up agricultural capital and secured 
ideological hegemony by incorporating the middle classes, trade unions, and key officials of 
the socialist and communist parties. However, liberalisation of the economy had unexpected 
consequences. International capital increased profit through the development of constant 
capital and through economies of scale. These policies impoverished the middle classes and 
alienated them from the military. As Laclau writes ‘history was creating the conditions for a 
new pole of popular regrouping which was eventually to allow the antagonism between the 
middle class and the proletariat to be bypassed.’ (Laclau, 1970, p.13)  
 
This article anticipates Laclau’s later theoretical development. First, antagonism between the 
middle and the working classes is contingent. Second, a populist alliance is articulated 
between different sectors of a polity unified in antagonistic opposition to military elite. 
Antagonism is not drawn in the sand along class lines. Third, political ideology is not pre-
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determined by class position. Last articulation of antagonistic opposition requires the 
intervention of (weighty) ideological signifiers such as Peronism. Despite this, Laclau 
concludes, optimistically, that the working class will smash the bourgeois state, and replace it 
with popular institutions of mass power. 
 
If Laclau here relies on Marxist categories, his first major text Politics and Ideology in 
Marxist Theory (1977) stretches these to breaking point. On the one hand classes are defined 
as antagonistic because of their position in a mode of production. Thus ‘surplus-
value…constitutes simultaneously the relation between capitalists and workers and the 
antagonism between them; or rather, it constitutes that relation as an antagonistic one’ 
(Laclau, 1979: 104). On this account classes do not become antagonistic in a process of 
struggle. Populists, by contrast, recognise that in any social formation antagonism is framed 
in terms of dominated sectors, not classes. In fact Laclau contends that classes are constituted 
in struggle. Nonetheless, he remains a Marxist insisting a la Althusser that ‘every 
contradiction is overdetermined by class struggle’ (Laclau, 1977, p.106) and that the relations 
of production are determinate in the last instance. How are these contradictory impulses 
resolved? The people, Laclau contends, are articulated at the political and ideological level, 
while the aim of class struggle is to ‘articulate popular democratic interpellations in the 
ideological discourse of antagonistic classes…Every class struggles at the ideological level 
simultaneously as a class and as the people… [it] gives coherence to its ideological discourse 
by presenting its class objectives as the consummation of popular objectives’ (Laclau, 1977, 
p. 109). Classes are inherently antagonistic, yet populist struggles are not inherently class 
based. Rather popular struggles are the terrain on which classes operate to win their 
objectives. 
The force of Laclau and Mouffes’ working through of 1970s Marxist theory was realised in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. The authors argue that political antagonism is not 
determined by class position. Instead they reconceptualise radical democracy as the 
hegemonic articulation of different emancipatory demands against the emergent neo-liberal 
hegemony. This argument was supported by a novel political ontology: antagonism is 
indicative of the limit of social objectivity. Antagonism, they note, has been conceptualised in 
one of two ways: as real or as logical opposition. Real oppositions occur in the natural world. 
In a physical collision for example one or both objects may be destroyed. However, such 
collisions are not antagonistic. In the authors’ example class struggle is not antagonistic 
because a policeman hits a worker (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.124). Logical contradictions, 
by contrast, are conceptual. In this case the relation of the terms to each other exhausts their 
reality - logic presupposes the identity of its constituent units, and deductively determines 
what must be the case given these presumptions. However, logic is inadequate when 
describing political antagonisms. Political struggles are not the workings out of the rational 
choice theorists’ game theoretic fantasies.  
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In antagonistic struggle, they contend, the being of the antagonists is at stake. This contrasts 
with both logical and real contradictions because in these cases it is what the objects already 
are – conceptual objects or real objects – which makes the relation intelligible. In an 
antagonistic struggle ‘I cannot be a full presence for myself. Nor is the force that antagonises 
me such a full presence, its objective being is a symbol of my non-being and is overflowed by 
a plurality of meanings. Antagonism constitutes the limits of every objectivity ... [it] is the 
failure of difference’. Societies are constituted they argue ‘as a repression of the 
consciousness of the impossibility that penetrates them’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.127). 
Antagonism shows the failure of objectivity – of rationality, being, identity and language. 
The argument is reminiscent of Kant’s transcendental deduction but it side-steps the 
epistemological question. Antagonism is the condition of possibility of the being of any 
entity, subject or object. Kant precluded this form of transcendental investigation equating it 
with transcendental realism, seeking knowledge of the thing-in-itself (see Allison, 1983, 
Chapters 1 and 2). However for Laclau, the conditions of possibility of objectivity are at the 
same time its conditions of impossibility. 
 
Let me return to the Argentinian crisis of May 1969. Laclau’s analysis, thirty years later, 
would be similar: consideration of the overdetermined socio-political circumstances, 
specification of the dominant forms of interpellation, and attention to the moments when a 
dominant hegemony begins to crack. However, there would be important differences. 
Antagonism would not be considered in terms of a dominant class. Laclau would reject the 
claim that in the last instance relations of production determine possible actions within a 
social formation. Instead, the political actors concerned would have to come to view 
themselves as antagonists. This contingent antagonistic identity must be articulated to 
struggles with other sectors. Last, the experience of antagonism as the limit of an existing 
social formation also points to the impossibility of any social order resolving all antagonisms. 
The resolution of particular antagonisms does not resolve antagonism per se. Political 
subjects will still experience a lack of objectivity. Even when peace seems to prevail this 
represents the sedimentation of social relations, which are always – at least potentially – open 
to reactivation. The revolution does indeed last a long time. 
 
ANTAGONSIM and CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY 
 
Laclau’s conceptualisation of antagonism is, I would argue, crucial to thinking contemporary 
politics and theory. Here I indicate four potential areas of inquiry. 
 
Partisanship and Political Parties: Many critics contend that political parties are in crisis, 
noting low voter turnout, dwindling party membership, and mistrust of institutional politics. 
Mair (2013) suggests that this reflects a lack of partisan debate, the de-politicisation and 
professionalization of decision making, in attempts to quell the ‘dangerous passions’ of the 
masses. Laclau echoes these concerns: apparent consensus masks antagonisms which are 
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likely to be played upon through the right wing mobilisation of racist sentiment. In theoretical 
terms however Laclau offers an ontological defence of partisanship in politics. If antagonism 
can never finally be resolved and representation always requires the exercise of power, then 
not only is partisanship necessary, it is ever present. Political parties are one way of 
maintaining an agonistic battle over the terms of politics. Parties are by definition particular, 
parts within a nation state, claiming to represent the ‘national interest’. Their partisanship is 
regulated by agreed procedures and constitutional principles which limit conflict that might 
otherwise ensue in civil war. Parties both transmit (Sartori) and shape (Disch) how the people 
exercise power. The people have no existence unless ‘mobilised into conceiving themselves 
as and acting as a whole’ (Disch, 2012, p. 208) and it is political parties that compete to 
represent and give sense to, the people. Parties present themselves as if they are not partisans, 
as if they embody freedom, equality or justice. With rare exception (De Leon et al 2007) this 
aspect of Laclau’s work has not been deployed in the study of political parties. If parties 
compete to embody the universal, mobilising the passions of political subjects, then conflict 
which cannot be resolved by dialogue or deliberation is inevitable. In fact it is crucial to any 
representative democracy intent on vitalising and revitalising its political institutions. 
Sometimes these clashes require fundamental reformulations of the ground rules within 
which antagonists engage. To put this point plainly: antagonistic struggle between political 
parties entails both that the public sphere is not closed down by apparent consensus, and that 
the ground rules are at stake in the very game they claim to regulate. If the regulated sphere 
of party politics delegitimises antagonistic debate then it will emerge elsewhere, potentially 
in forms of violent resistance.  
 
Representation: The notion of antagonism entails that politics extends beyond the system of 
political representation and power. Laclau builds on the work of Foucault, of feminist 
theorists, and indeed of Marx, to recognise that any area of social life is open to politicisation. 
The reactivation of previously sedimented relations may put in to question what once seemed 
objectively verifiable. This extension of the remit of politics goes hand in hand with an 
empirical pluralisation of political antagonisms, and the claim that representation itself 
constitutes the object it claims to represent. For Disch deliberative democrats cannot ‘face up 
to the empirical reality of the ideological as a rhetorical process of representation’ which 
entails that independence from partisanship in politics is not possible (Disch, 2011, p. 
105).The rationalist ideal relies on an aristocratic account of knowledge which democrats 
should reject. Even if elected to represent a particular constituency the representative takes 
these demands into another context where they have to be re-presented, reiterated, and 
reformulated. Democratic theory assumes that it is the people who govern. This norm allows 
for governments to be judged insofar as they represent the needs of their constituents. If, 
however, the people are constructed through complex processes of representation, if 
imaginative identification with political ideals makes rational assessment of political 
commitments impossible, if the universal is an empty place open to hegemonic articulation, 
then the democratic ideal itself is open to hegemonic struggle (Disch, 2011, p.111). I would 
not demur from this account. I would add that for Laclau political representation is always 
caught up in an antagonistic battle which seeks to delimit the accepted terms for political 
contestation, to determine what is proper to the political, and who may legitimately claim to 
act politically. On this account we can begin to reconceptualise democratic struggles as a 
demand for equality in excess of the accepted terms of representation.  
 
Idealisation: Laclau argued that all forms of apparent positivity are metaphorical. If there is 
no positive ground to the social then any theory which posits grounds – no matter how 
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minimal these may be - is a priori rhetorical. Laclau seems then to rejects idealisation – the 
assumption of possible rational consensus in deliberative theories; imagined original 
positions or social contracts; or a true general will. On Laclau’s account these are all attempts 
to neutralise conflict. However, Laclau’s critique of these positions does not conclude that 
ideals are antithetical to political conflict. Recognition that the ideals we defend are 
contingent is the moment at which an endless justification, the endless struggle to realise and 
achieve these ideals, is opened. More precisely, idealisation here touches upon ideology. 
Contrary to those who assume that the age of ideology has passed, that the notion of ideology 
presupposes a politics of superior knowledge, Laclau recasts idealisation as central to the 
ideological closure of the social. The most recent form of such ideological closure is ‘the 
dream of the various versions of the ‘end of ideology’ generally associated with the ideal of 
pure, non-political, administrative practices’ (Laclau, 2015, p.36). If this particular version of 
ideological closure is rejected by Laclau we should nonetheless recognise that ideals, as 
empty signifiers, operate to destabilise existing hegemonies, and to articulate opposition to a 
dominant order. Idealisation mobilises antagonism, and articulates antagonists, against 
dominant forms of power.  
 
Radical Politics in the 21st Century: For Laclau antagonism indicates the end of the idea of 
privileged subjects of history. The articulation of a counter hegemonic politics depends on a 
radical investment on the part of subjects who are transformed in the process. Politics then is 
not simply about the rational evaluation of alternatives, but about political identifications 
which transform the subject – collective or individual – engaged in political action. 
Antagonism indicates that the subjectivity of the subject is at stake in any political struggle 
and that, as Freud noted almost a century ago, the individual is always already a composite of 
many identifications, rather than an essence unto itself. How is this relevant to thinking 
contemporary forms of resistance? Both Laclau and Mouffe are critical of the anarchist 
strands of contemporary protest. Mouffe rejects a politics of withdrawal – whether on 
anarchist or other grounds – because ‘without institutional relays the[se movements] will not 
be able to bring about significant changes…and their protests against the neo-liberal order 
risk soon being forgotten’ (Mouffe, 2015, p.77). Laclau also rejected the immanentist 
ontologies which lend support to these ideals, in particular that of Hardt and Negri. The 
radical negativity of antagonism requires engagement in a war of position aimed at radically 
transforming ‘through an internal process of rearticulation’ (Mouffe 2015, p.82) 
contemporary socio-economic orders. For Mouffe recent protest movements risk moralism 
and end up mimicking liberalism. They celebrate an ethic of diversity and tolerance while 
demonizing the state (Mouffe, 2014, 119). Mouffe contrasts this with the politics of 
Kirchnerism in Argentina where protest movements worked hand in hand with representative 
institutions to challenge the hegemony of neoliberalism. I am broadly sympathetic to this 
critique of immanentism in political theory. There is no multitude waiting to arise from its 
petrification. However, there is more to be said about the form that recent antagonistic 
protests have taken.  
 
Antagonistic politics must first address how the hegemony of so called ‘neo-liberalism’ is 
secured through forms of equivalence which have little to do with the articulation of a 
popular will. This was precisely what Laclau’s acute analysis of the crisis of 1969 in 
Argentina aimed to do. Note inter alia the abstract forms of property ownership and control, 
the various forms of measurement and quantification, the ‘economisation’ of political 
relations, and the proliferation of discourses of quality control all of which negate political 
participation in the name of value neutrality and accountability. The left must reframe these 
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apparently neutral infra-structural logics which recast worlds as calculable and manageable 
assets. Laclau’s account of populism is a powerful account of how unity is engendered in the 
name of a democratic politics. However, populist opposition misses its target if it cannot 
account for the shift shaping technologies of financial and calculative equivalence. These 
technologies cement particular ways of acting, thinking and being. They enact forms of 
governmentality which radically alter perceptions of, and attitudes to, space, money, and the 
vocabulary of our democratic heritage: accountability, value and equality. Recent forms of 
protest reject institutional solutions only because the institutions already bypass the 
democratic imaginary. These are improper protests, protests which do not aim to transform 
the proper space of politics, but to establish new spaces where politics can once again take 
place. Thus far discourse theorists have failed to come to terms with these logics, both those 
of protest, and those of the financial and monetary equivalences which structure hegemony 
today.  
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